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Abstract. In response to the problems that have arisen regarding the
terminology and concepts of agent-oriented systems, previous work has
described a formal framework for understanding agency and autonomy.
In particular, this work made the claim that the framework could serve
as a vehicle for the precise presentation and evaluation of models and
theories of multi-agent systems. We support this claim by outlining the
framework and rening it through adding further levels of detail to for-
malise the concepts of external descriptions and social dependence net-
works. Social Dependence Networks are a valuable source of information
about the relationships within a multi-agent world. They allow agents to
reason about the resources and capabilities of others in order that they
may enter into a negotiation to persuade these others to assist them
in completing their tasks. By formalising social dependence networks
within the framework we are able to identify deciencies in the original
characterisation of the networks and the external descriptions of agents
within them. We address these deciencies, and oer a modied view
which removes much of the ambiguity and presents a stronger and more
consistent formal model. In reformulating these networks in this way, we
also present a case study which shows how the formal framework that
has been previously developed can be applied to provide an environ-
ment in which we can describe and reason about theories and models of
multi-agent systems.
1 Introduction
There is a growing recognition within the multi-agent system (MAS) community
of the need to harmonise the eorts being made in dierent sub-elds and so
derive a well-dened discipline of MAS [15]. Previously, we have developed a
principled theory of agency and autonomy through the provision of a formal
framework which denes these concepts and species the relationship between
them [8]. This framework was an attempt to provide strong denitions, not
only to be precise about the meaning of terms which often have an ambiguous
interpretation, but also to serve as an environment in which theories and models
of multi-agents systems can be presented, evaluated and developed. In this paper
we illustrate how this can be done by adding detail to the framework to describe
social dependence networks (SDN) [12]. Specifying SDNs formally in this way
has allowed us to note inconsistencies and ambiguities in the work and suggest
possibilities for its development as a useful mechanism for social agents.
As stated elsewhere[8], in the current work, we have adopted the specication
language Z [14] for two major reasons. First, it provides modularity and abstrac-
tion and is suciently expressive to allow a consistent, unied and structured
account of a computer system and its associated operations. Such structured
specications enable the description of systems at dierent levels of abstraction,
with system complexity being added at successively lower levels. Second, we view
our enterprise as that of building programs. Z schemas are particularly suitable
in squaring the demands of formal modelling with the need for implementa-
tion by providing clear and unambiguous denitions of state and operations on
state which provide a basis for program development. Thus our approach to for-
mal specication is pragmatic | we need to be formal to be precise about the
concepts we discuss, yet we want to remain directly connected to issues of im-
plementation. Z provides just those qualities that are needed, and is increasingly
being used for specifying frameworks and systems in AI [6, 3, 11] and related
areas [4, 5].
The paper begins with a brief description of Social Dependence Networks [12],
and continues with a very short outline of the agent hierarchy specied previously
[8]. The next section extends and renes the specication of the agent hierarchy
to specify SDNs formally. This allows us to evaluate and reason about these
mechanisms in terms of our formal framework. We then develop and propose
a rened model of dependence networks based on our notions of agency and
autonomy. Lastly, we draw conclusions made from this case study of applying
the framework we have developed.
2 External Descriptions and Dependence Networks
Dependence networks [12] are structures that form the basis of a computational
model of Social Power Theory [1, 2]. They allow agents to reason about, and
understand, the collective group of agents that make up the multi-agent world
in which they operate. This section introduces dependence networks and external
descriptions, data structures used to store information about other agents, based
on the work reported by Sichman et al. [12].
External descriptions store information about other agents, and comprise a
set of goals, actions, resources and plans for each such agent. The goals are those
an agent wants to achieve, the actions are those an agent is able to perform, the
resources are those over which an agent has control, and the plans are those
available to the agent, but using actions and resources which are not necessarily
available to the agent. This means that one agent may depend on another in
terms of actions or resources in order for a plan to be executed.
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Notice that an agent has a model of itself as well as others. The authors
adopt what they call the hypothesis of external description compatibility which
states that any two agents will have precisely the same external description of
any other agent. This is stated as follows.
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ated action within a plan is dened by the action itself and the set of resources
used in the instantiation of this action:
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Note that this makes the denition of the resources of a plan redundant: if
you know the resources required by each action within a plan, then you must
also know the set of all the resources required by the plan.
3 An Overview of the Framework for Agency and
Autonomy
Before we can attempt to reformulate the work described above in a broader
formal framework, we must rst provide an overview of that framework, specied
in Z. Our basic component is an entity [10]. An entity consists of four constituents
as follows: a set of attributes, which are perceivable qualities of the entity; a set
of actions, which dene the basic capabilities of the agent; a set of goals, which
are the goals that can be ascribed to the entity which characterise its agency ; and
a set of internal non-derivable motivations which dene an entity's autonomy .
Entity
attributes : Attribute
capableof : Action
goals : Goal
motivations : Motivation
attributes 6= fg
Using this schema we can dene certain categories of entity. In particular, an
object is any entity with a non-empty set of capabilities, an agent is any object
with a non-empty set of goals, and an autonomous agent is any agent with a
non-empty set of motivations.
Object
Entity
capableof 6= fg
Agent
Object
goals 6= fg
AutonomousAgent
Agent
motivations 6= fg
A full treatment of the framework which has subsequently been rened and
developed in a number of ways can be found in [10]. A model of how goals
are generated by motivated agents (which we take to be the dening quality
of autonomy), and subsequently adopted by non-autonomous agents has been
constructed [9]. We have also shown how certain social structures | cooperation
between autonomous agents, and engagements of non-autonomous agents |
arise as a result of such goal generation and adoption [7].
In addition, we can easily rene components within the framework to provide,
for example, a high level specication of an autonomous planning agent. Consider
the next schema which describes such a renement. A planning agent is an agent
with a set of plans associated with a set of goals. Each plan in the set is a possible
means of bringing about the associated goal. Some subset of these goals are
ones that the agent currently desires; it might have plans for a goal it does not
currently desire. We dene a complete plan to be a sequence of actions. (There
are, certainly, other types of plan, but this will be sucient for the presentation
of SDNs in this paper.)
Plan == seqAction
PlanningAgent
Agent
plans : Plan
planforgoal : GoalPlan
goals  dom planforgoal
S
(ranplanforgoal) = plans
The schema states that all the plans of an agent must be associated with
a goal, although it may be that the set of plans associated with a goal is the
empty set. It might also be that a plan brings about more than one goal of the
planning agent.
4 Dependence Networks within the Formal Framework
By using this framework, specied in Z, as a basis for reformulating the model
of SDNs, we can provide a clear and unambiguous formal model, and highlight
some of the potential ambiguities which arise within the existing model. We take
actions, goals and plans in the original model to be actions, goals and plans in
the Z framework. We take a resource to mean some entity | an object, agent
or autonomous agent.
4.1 External Descriptions
To deal with an external description, we must rene our denition of a simple
planning agent by including three additional variables. The rst, ownedresources,
represents the set of resources which an agent owns. The second, instsreq , models
the set of resources needed to instantiate an action within a plan. The third,
redundant variable, resourcesofplan, is included for readability and records the
total set of resources required by a plan.
There are two predicates in the lower part of the schema which relate the
variables in the schema as follows: stripping the set of entities away from each
instantiated action gives the original plan; and the resources of a plan are the
union of each set of entities associated with each action of the plan.
ExternalDescription
PlanningAgent
ownedresources : Entity
instsreq : Plan (seq (Action Entity))
resourcesofplan : PlanEntity
plans = mapset (mapseq rst) (ran instsreq)
8 p : Plan  resourcesofplan p =
S
(ran (mapseq second (instsreq p)))
Now, since every external description of an agent is the same, we can model
the formalism very simply. An agent, A, has associated with it an external de-
scription which is precisely the model that every agent (including agent A) has
of agent A (according to the hypothesis of external description compatibility).
World
extdes : Agent ExternalDescription
Then, according to the external description of some agent, i ,
(extdes i):plans is its set of plans,
(extdes i):capableof is its set of actions,
(extdes i):ownedresources is its set of resources and
(extdes i):goals is its set of goals.
Discussion There are several diculties that become apparent when the SDN
model is reformulated in this way. First of all, the distinction between a resource
and an agent is not clear. For example, is a benevolent agent, who will always
adopt the goals of another, a resource or an agent? It seems that some arbitrary
distinction, presumably, will have to be made. This distinction is important since
the nature of a plan assumes that all of the resources of an action have already
been identied, but the agents which could possibly perform some action have
not. In this respect, a partial plan where the resources required (whatever they
may be) have not yet been considered, cannot be represented.
It is also limiting in that two agents cannot perform the same action simulta-
neously. For example, the act of lifting a table might require two agents together
performing a basic lift action. When reasoning about the multi-agent world in
particular, where cooperation is likely to ensue, this seems a stringent restriction.
In addition, the notion of ownership in these external descriptions is not
clear. We take it to mean that an agent owns another entity, if, for whatever the
reason, that entity can be used for any action within its capabilities whenever
the agent requires it. In other words, a resource in this formalism can be seen
as a benevolent agent, adopting the goals of others' (to subsequently perform
an action to satisfy those goals) whenever it can. Even then, however, there
are further subtleties to consider. For example, many agents may own the same
resource (such as a printer) but there is no mention of a shared resource. There
may also be some degree of ownership in that my manager may always be able
to use the printer before me, or some weaker notion of ownership like a desk
in a shared oce which can only be used by one of the occupants at a time.
Clearly, a much richer notion of ownership is required. By contrast, the agent
hierarchy allows us to be much clearer about the nature of these relationships
which will depend on the type of entity and which goal dependence networks
exist between the entities in the environment. If the entity required for some
action is an object, then instantiating it as an agent is straightforward. If the
entity is a non-autonomous agent, then the planning agent must reason about
the nature of its agency further. (For example, can it share this agent? Can it
persuade other agents that are currently engaging it to release it?) If the entity
is an autonomous agent, then the planning agent will need to negotiate with the
autonomous agent to persuade it to adopt its goal. More details of these social
structures can be found in [9].
The hypothesis of external description compatibility ensures that any two
agents will agree on the model of themselves and each other. Though the authors
argue that there is no loss of generality, it is dicult to see how this can be so. A
truly autonomous agent will have its own view of the world around it which may
bear no relation to another agent's interpretation of its world. In general, we
argue, any model of the world that an autonomous agent has of the world must
be subjective. Certainly, a truly autonomous agent can never know the plans and
goals of another agent; it may only infer them by evaluating the behaviour of
the other agent. The authors themselves go some way along this path when they
recognise in a later paper some of these diculties [13], but they still require
an agent to have complete (and correct) knowledge of other agents' plans, for
example, which is untenable.
In Section 5, we will provide a formal specication which allows for concur-
rent actions in a plan, an important requirement of general purpose multi-agent
systems. We do not arbitrarily distinguish agents from resources, but instead con-
sider agents with dierent functionalities. In this way we can provide a clearer
and more intuitive representation of the social structures in the world since a
planning agent would have to consider merely the set of agents that are re-
quired in a plan. Some of these agents might be invoked directly, some might be
shared with some other agent, and some might be autonomous agents requiring
negotiation. These ideas are developed further in [7].
4.2 Denitions of Autonomy
Using external descriptions, Sichman et al. distinguish three dierent forms of
autonomy. An agent is a-autonomous for a given goal according to a set of plans
of another to bring about that goal if there is a plan in this set that achieves
the goal, and every action in each plan belongs to the capabilities of the agent.
An agent is r-autonomous for a given goal according to a set of plans of another
to bring about that goal if there is a plan in this set that achieves the goal,
and every resource required by the plan is owned by the agent. An agent is
s-autonomous for a given goal if it is both a-autonomous and r-autonomous.
In the following schema, we dene these three classes of autonomy using of
a new relation, achieves. The predicate, achieves (a; g ; ps), holds precisely when
an agent, a, has goal, g , and the non-empty set of plans associated with g in
order to achieve it, is ps.
Thus in the schema below, the rst predicate states that an agent, a, is a-
autonomous with respect to some set of plans, ps, if and only if there is some
agent, c, with goal, g , and plans, ps, to achieve g such that some plan, p in ps,
contains actions all in the capabilities of a. Similar predicate are specied for
r-autonomous and s-autonomous. Finally, the achieves predicate is specied as
dened above.
AutonomyRelations
World
aaut ; raut ; saut ; achieves : (Agent Goal  Plan)
8 a : Agent ; g : Goal ; ps : Plan 
aaut (a; g;ps), (9 c : Agent  achieves (c;g;ps)) ^
(9 p : ps  (ran p  (extdes a):capableof)) ^
raut (a;g;ps), (9 c : Agent  achieves (c; g;ps)) ^
(9p : ps  (extdes a):resourcesofplan p  (extdes a):ownedresources) ^
saut (a; g; ps), aaut (a;g; ps) ^ raut (a; g;ps) ^
achieves (a;g;ps), g 2 (extdes a):goals ^
(g;ps) 2 (extdes a):planforgoal ^ ps 6= f g
In the denition of achieves, the expression g 2 (extdes a):goals states that an
agent can only reason with respect to a set of plans associated with a current goal
(i.e. one that it desires). However, in the original description, there is ambiguity
about whether this must be so. The mathematical denitions make no mention of
whether this proviso is part of the mechanism. If we are guided by the examples
given by Sichman, however, it would appear that this proviso is, in fact, included.
Using the formal framework ensures that we are precise and unambiguous about
any denitions presented within it. This is particularly important in this case,
since whichever denition is used has ramications for social dependence network
categorisations. This is explored more fully in section 4.4.
According to these denitions, if agents are autonomous, then they may not
depend, for resources or actions, on other agents. Consequently, the fact that a
pocket calculator has the resources and the actions necessary for adding some
numbers makes it autonomous. (By contrast, we have argued elsewhere that
autonomy is not simply action or resource dependence, but involves the ability
to make one's own choices, to generate goals [8].)
Nevertheless, these notions are useful to a motivated agent since in some
motivational contexts, knowledge of the dependencies that exist between agents
is important. They provide information as to when a goal can be satised (by
performing the actions in a plan) without involving any other agents. Naturally,
a planning agent may decide to pursue a plan that does involve others even if
able to carry it out alone, for reasons of, for example, laziness, distribution of
responsibility, eciency, and so on.
4.3 Dependence Relations
Now we can consider the types of dependencies that exist between agents. An
agent, A, a-depends on another agent, B , for a given goal, g , according to some
set of plans of another to achieve g , if it has g as a goal, is not a-autonomous
for g , and at least one action used in this plan is in B 's capabilities. An agent,
A, r-depends on another agent, B , for a given goal, g , according to some set of
plans of another to achieve g , if it has g as a goal, is not r-autonomous for g ,
and at least one instantiation used in this plan is owned by B . An agent, A,
s-depends on another agent, B , for a given goal, g , if it r-depends or a-depends
on B .
The rst predicate in the schema below states that given two agents, a and
b, a goal, g , and a set of plans according to which a is not a-autonomous with
respect to g , a a-depends on b for g with respect to ps, if and only if there is
some agent, c, with the goal, g , and plans to achieve g , ps, such that at least
one plan in ps has an action in the capabilities of agent b.
DependencyRelations
AutonomyRelations
adep ; rdep ; sdep : (Agent Agent Goal  Plan)
8 a;b : Agent ; g : Goal ; ps : Plan j a 6= b ^ (g 2 (extdes a):goals) 
adep (a; b; g;ps), : aaut (a; g;ps) ^
(9 c : Agent  achieves (c; g;ps) ^
S
fp : ps  ran pg\
(extdes b):capableof 6= f g) ^
rdep (a; b; g;ps), : raut (a;g;ps) ^
(9 c : Agent  achieves (c; g;ps) ^
(9 p : ps  ((extdes c):resourcesofplan p)\
(extdes b):ownedresources 6= f g)) ^
sdep (a; b; g;ps), adep (a;b; g;ps) _ rdep (a;b; g;ps)
This reformulation also highlights some diculties. As stated earlier, at no
point is it made clear whether two agents can share an action or a resource.
Second, it makes little sense to say that I a-depend on an agent for some goal
if the actions that achieve that goal are in my capabilities. Similarly, it also
makes little sense to say that I r-depend on some agent for some resource if that
resource is also owned by myself. A more intuitive denition might be
adep (a;b; g; ps), (9 c : Agent  achieves (c;g;ps) ^
(9 x :
S
fp : ps  ran pg  x 2 (extdes b):capableof ^ x =2 (extdes a):capableof))
However, even when an agent is capable of some action of which I am not
capable, and which I require for some plan, it again makes little sense to say
there is a dependency. It is more appropriate to say that there is a possibility of
that agent being able to help in achieving a goal. There is no doubt that such
reasoning will be useful in certain situations. A better notion of actual depen-
dency with respect to a goal, would be if every plan in the set of plans required
some agent's assistance. In this respect there would be a real dependency on this
agent in order to achieve the goal.
adep (a;b; g; ps), (9 c : Agent  achieves (c;g;ps) ^
(8 p : ps  9 x : ranp  x 2 (extdes b):capableof ^ x =2 (extdes a):capableof )))
These relations provide an agent with the structures that can be used to
reason about others with a view to choosing an appropriate course of action in
the context of its dependencies on others' goals, plans, resources, and so on.
4.4 Dependence Situations
Sichman proceeds to use these relations to classify distinct dependency relations
which arise. This subsection considers these situations. We must rst note that
there is an ambiguity between Sichman's mathematical and textual descriptions
of dependency [12]. In the mathematical description, the dependency refers to
any set of plans which any agent has, but the textual description refers only to
the plans of the reasoning agent. In the interpretation that follows, we adopt
the more restrictive version since it is consistent with the given notions of in-
dependence and unilateral dependence discussed later, and is more intuitive in
reecting the nature of autonomous agents. (We might equally have chosen the
other alternative, however.)
Consider the situation where we have two agents, A and B , where A is not
a-autonomous for some goal, g
1
, according to A's plans, ps
1
, to achieve g
1
. We
can then recognise the following situations.
A is independent with respect to B for g
1
if, according to ps
1
, it infers that
it does not a-depend on B for g
1
.
A is unilaterally dependent on B if, according to ps
1
, A a-depends on B , but
there is no goal for which B a-depends on A.
Two agents are mutually dependent if they a-depend on each other for the
same goal g
1
according to ps
1
.
If, in addition, B is not a-autonomous for some goal, g
2
, according to A's
plans to achieve g
2
then we can also write the following.
Two agents are reciprocally dependent if they a-depend on each other for two
dierent goals, g
1
and g
2
, according to two sets of plans, ps
1
and ps
2
respectively.
Thus, given two agents, A and B , where A is not a-autonomous for some
goal, g , we dene the previous dependence situations with respect to g in the
schema below.
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These denitions would be more sensible if they were based on dependencies
for actions which an agent does not have. For example, if A is independent of
B , it implies that there is no way that B could help A in performing an action.
A more intuitive denition of independence would be that A does not need B .
Consider the denition of mutual dependence between A and B . It states that
A and B both have a goal g
1
, and according to A's plans to achieve g
1
, there is
some plan in which B could perform an action, and some plan (not necessarily
the same plan) in which A could perform an action. What this categorisation
describes is a potential for cooperation. A more intuitive denition of mutual
dependence would be that every plan in the set needs both agents.
Reciprocal dependence occurs when, according to two sets of plans, A could
help B achieve some goal g1, and B could help A achieve some goal g2. However,
since the denition is with respect to A's plans, if we assume that agents can only
reason with respect to sets of plans associated with a desired goal (as suggested
by the authors), it must be that A currently desires both goals g
1
and g
2
. This is
very restrictive since it rules out the possibility of bargaining when A has only
one goal, for example, and B has only one other goal. In such a case, both agents
may then help each other by adopting the other's goals.
The mechanism is described as social exchange, and the authors state that
\one of them will have to adopt the other's goal rst in order to achieve his own
one in the future". As we have seen in one interpretation of this mechanism, A
must necessarily have both goals, so this scenario is inappropriate. Even then,
it is too restrictive since both plans may be carried out concurrently.
4.5 Local and Mutual Belief
The dependencies described above can be locally or mutually believed. A depen-
dence is local if it only exists with respect to A's plans but not with respect to
B 's, and it is mutual if it occurs with respect to both A's and B 's plans.
DependencySituationsLocalandMutual
DependencySituations
lbmd ;mbmd : 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More problems arise here, too. Notice, in particular, that both local and
mutual belief require an analysis of both A's and B 's plans, thus contradicting
the following claim:
\An agent locally believes a given dependence if he uses exclusively his
own plans when reasoning about the others : : :" [12]
In a subsequent paper, the authors drop the hypothesis of external descrip-
tion compatibility and instead concentrate on how they might detect agency level
inconsistency resulting from two agents having dierent external description en-
tries regarding each other [13]. However, it is also noticeable that their denition
of mutually believed mutual dependence (MBMD) bears little relation to that
proposed in the earlier paper [12]. The later denition is as follows:
\As an example, if i infers a MBMD between himself and j for a certain
goal g , this means he believes that (i) both of them have this goal and
at least one plan to achieve it (ii) there is an action needed in this plan
that he can perform and j can not perform (iii) there is an action needed
in this plan that j can perform and he can not perform. " [13]
But the mathematical denition provides a dierent account of mutually
believed mutual dependence: A and B both have goal g ; according to A's plans
A and B are not a-autonomous with respect to g ; according to B 's plans A
and B are not a-autonomous with respect to g ; there is some plan of A's which
contains an action which B can do and a plan (possibly the same) which contains
an action which A can do, and there is some plan of B 's which contains an action
which A can do and a plan (possibly the same) which contains an action which
B can do.
In particular, the mathematical denition is not given in terms of an action
not being in some agent's capabilities and, further, there is no mention of a
particular plan within the set of plans, as required by the textual description
above. This is precisely the kind of inconsistency we hope to avoid by specifying
the mechanism formally within our framework, since we are then able to provide
a unied and complete account of a system.
In the same paper [13], the authors do not assume the hypothesis of external
description compatibility but state the following.
\For simplicity, let us consider that the plans of the agents are the same
and both of them know the plans of the other."
Consequently, there can be agent level consistency in terms of what agents
believe about the capabilities, resources and goals of each other, assuming they
know the plans of every agent. This is evidently very useful, even though severely
limiting, and further work explores agent reasoning about this class of problem.
5 A New Proposal
In this section we briey describe a new proposal for external descriptions which
allows for true autonomy (in the sense that an agent can never know the goals,
actions and plans of another), simultaneous actions, active and non-active goals
and plans, partial plans and a richer understanding of the social relationship
between the entities in the world. In this respect, we can re-formulate the useful
work of social dependence networks within a well-dened formal framework for
agency and autonomy.
Consider xing a screw into a block of wood. According to our hierarchical
framework, this may require two agents: a screwdriver, and someone with the
ability to use the screwdriver, both agents performing an action simultaneously.
Every action in a plan must either be associated with the entity intended to to
perform the action, or be associated with no entity if the entity involved in its
instantiation has not yet been chosen.
In the following example, we illustrate our new representation of a plan for use
in external descriptions. It consists of an action which I will perform, followed by
two actions performed by two entities simultaneously, followed by three actions
performed simultaneously by three entities (including one by me), followed by
some action to be performed by an as yet unknown entity.
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A plan, therefore, has the following new type.
NewPlan == seq ((Action (Entity)))
The schema below species an external description which includes the current
goals of an agent. Associated with each such goal are a set of plans which together
form the set of current plans. In addition, we also dene the set of all goals of
an agent | some of which are currently desired and some of which are not |
and the corresponding set of all plans. (Note that in this respect we can be
clear about categorisations based on certain types of plans, goals and so on.)
In addition, we dene three useful but redundant variables which for each plan
return the set of action-entity pairs, actions, and entities involved in the plan,
respectively. The last predicate ensures that given an action-entity pair in a plan
where the entity is dened, the action must be in the capabilities of the entity.
NewExternalDescription
Agent
plans : NewPlan
allgoals : Goal
allplans : NewPlan
planforgoal : GoalNewPlan
actionsofplan : NewPlan"Action
entitiesofplan : NewPlan"Entity
actionentities : NewPlan"(Action Entity)
goals  dom planforgoal
plans = fp : NewPlan; g : Goal j g 2 goals ^ p 2 planforgoal g  pg
allgoals = dom planforgoal
allplans =
S
(ranplanforgoal)
8 p : NewPlan  actionsofplan p = faes : actionentities p  rst aesg ^
entitiesofplan p =
S
faes : actionentities p  second aesg ^
actionentities p =
S
(ran p) ^ (8aes : actionentities p; e : Entity j
second aes = feg  rst aes 2 e:capableof)
Further work can then progress using the denitions given above to provide
new social dependence network categorisations based on the original formalisms.
As a small example, we can say that an agent is t-autonomous with respect
to a plan if all the actions the plan contains are within its own capabilities.
Essentially:
taut (agent ; plan), actionsofplan plan  (agent :capableof )
6 Conclusions
Social Dependence Networks are a valuable source of information about the re-
lationships within a multi-agent world, and provide the necessary structure that
can be exploited by agents in order to function eectively. They allow agents to
reason about resources and capabilities of others in order that they may enter
into a negotiation to persuade these others to assist them in completing their
tasks. This paper has described the work of Sichman et al. in developing com-
putational models of dependence networks and has reformulated it in another,
formal, framework. By reformulating it in these terms, we have been able to iden-
tify deciencies in the original characterisation of dependence networks and the
external descriptions of agents within the networks. We have addressed these
deciencies, and oer a modied view of external descriptions which removes
much of the ambiguity and presents a stronger and more consistent, formal
model which can easily be extended to dene social dependence networks.
In reformulating dependence networks in this way, we have also presented a
case study which shows how the formal framework that we have previously de-
veloped can be applied to provide an environment in which we can describe and
reason about theories and models of MAS. Moreover, we have highlighted incon-
sistencies and ambiguities, and outlined how such models may be incorporated
within our framework.
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A Introduction to Z
The formal specication language Z is based on set theory, rst order logic and
predicate calculus. It extends the use of these languages by allowing an additional
mathematical type known as the schema type. Z schemas have two parts: the
upper, declarative, part which declares variables and their types, and the lower,
predicate, part which relates and constrains those variables. The type of any
schema can be considered as the cartesian product of the types of each of its
variables, without any notion of order, but constrained by predicates. Modularity
is facilitated in Z by allowing schemas to be included within other schemas. We
can select a state variable, var , of a schema, schema, by writing schema:var .
To introduce a type in Z, where we wish to abstract away from the actual
content of elements of the type, we use the notion of a given set. We may write
NODE to represent the set of all nodes. If we wish to state that a variable takes
on some set of values or an ordered pair of values we write x : NODE ; x :
NODE NODE , respectively. The generic functions rst and second return the
rst element and second element of any ordered pair, respectively.
A relation type expresses some relationship between two existing types, known
as the source and target type. When no element from the source type can be re-
lated to two or more elements from the target type, the relation is a function.
A total function (") is one where every element in the source set is related,
while a partial function () is where not every element in the source is related.
Finally, A sequence (seq)is a special type of function where the domain is the
contiguous set of numbers from 1 up to the number of elements in the sequence.
For example, consider the following function which denes a relation between
nodes: Rel = f(node1; node2); (node2; node3); (node3; node2); (node4; node4)g.
The domain (dom) of a relation or function is those elements in the source set
which are related, and the range (ran) is those elements in the target set which
are related. In this case domRel = fnode1; node2; node3; node4g and ranRel =
fnode2; node3; node4g.
Sets of elements can be dened using set comprehension. For example, the
following expression denotes the set of squares of natural numbers greater than
10 fx :  j x > 10  x  xg. The way to write down predicates in Z is non-
standard. To state that, say, any number greater than 10 has a square greater
than 100, we write: 8 n :  j n > 10  n  n > 100.
Lastly, we make use of mapseq , which takes a function and a sequence and
applies the function to each element of the sequence and mapset , which takes a
function and a set and applies the function to each element of the set.
[X ;Y ]
mapseq : (X Y ) seqX  seqY
mapset : (X  Y )XY
8 seqs : seqX ; xs : X ; fun : X Y 
mapseq fun seqs = fn :  j n 2 1 : :#seqs  (n; fun (seqs n))g ^
mapset fun xs = fx : X j x 2 xs  fun xg
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